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Interview with Prof. Howard Eissenstat By Vahram Emiyan Howard Eissenstat completed his Ph.D. in Near Eastern History at the University of California, Los Angeles and is currently an Assistant Professor of History at Seton Hall University and a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University. Prof.Eissenstat granted me the following Interview:
Vahram Emiyan:- Can we say that the Turkish republic is built on two traumatisms, the Armenian Genocide and the secularization of Turkish society?
Prof. Howard Eissenstat:- I think that it would be fairer to say that the Turkish Republic was a product of Ottoman imperial collapse. Within this context, the Armenian Genocide was the most intense chapter of a longer story of "population engineering" and ethnic cleansing which marked that collapse. I think that the secularization of Turkey should be seen in a similar light: the Kemalists' program of secularization was an intensification of a much longer program of top-down reform, stretching back to the first half of the nineteenth century. The real question, in both of these cases, stems from the shift to democracy after World War II: namely, how does a state founded on radical homogenization and top-down modernization adapt to an age of pluralism and democracy.
V.Emiyan:- On April 13, 2007 president Ahmet Necdet Sezer declared that the secular system faces its gravest threat since 1923 and parliament speaker Bulent Arinc responded by saying that the regime is not in danger it is the power of those who support the status quo which is in danger. What is your view on this matter?
Prof. Eissenstat:-I think Arinc was probably closer to the truth. There is indeed a power struggle – or rather a series of power struggles – within Turkey. As many commentators have noted, part of this conflict is between an old elite that was wedded, both economically and ideologically, to a state monopoly on power and a new elite which is more market oriented, and, at the same time, more likely to be religiously devout and socially conservative. At the same time, it is fair to note that the AKP's success is not only based on its devout base, but also on its program of political and economic liberalization, its ability to reach out to other constituencies, and – most importantly – its economic success. For myself, the real basis of the crisis can be found in four interwoven problems. The first is the inability of traditional Turkish nationalism to successfully adapt to democratization and globalization. The second is the clumsiness of the Turkish Constitution, written under the auspices of the military in the aftermath of the 1980 coup. The third is the failure of the Turkish system to create a clear boundary between state and political institutions. This includes not only the military's intervention in political life, but also the politicization of the courts, and the long tradition of political parties laying claim to ministries by giving positions to their supporters. Finally, I think the roots of the crisis can be found in the failure of Turkish society to adapt to its own dynamism: Turkish society is increasingly diverse and educated. But Turkish nationalism, which has made a fetish of national unity, has not created the tolerance needed to deal with this dynamism. One of the striking things about this crisis is how little respect and trust the sides have for each other, how inclined they are to assume that the other side is acting only out of venal interest. This lack of basic trust makes compromise far more difficult and a real crisis far more likely.
V.Emiyan:- Can the election of an Islamist president and government be considered a step forward or backward and why?
Prof.Eissenstat:- I think it is too early to tell whether this government will be a step forward or not, if only because we have not yet seen the results of this crisis. If the crisis can be weathered and democratic institutions be strengthened, that would be a tremendous success. If the crisis ends in a hard coup, the results would be disastrous. That being said, I don't think the best way to understand the AKP is as an "Islamist party." To do that stretches the meaning of Islamism too far and underplays the extent to which the AKP and its base believe in Turkish institutions and in a democratic Turkey. Are there Islamists with the AKP? Certainly. But to frame every devout Muslim as an Islamist is, I think, a very fundamental error.
V. Emiyan:- The Islamists in Turkey appear to be pro-European, while the secularists appear to be anti-European. Are these appearances deceiving?
Prof. Eissenstat:- Across the political spectrum, Turkish attitudes to membership in the European Union are complex. In general, however, I think it is fair to say that most Turkish politician and officials have long understood that full membership in the European Union is unlikely and distant prospect. Many Turkish politicians – like their European counterparts – have used the promise of European Union membership for political and economic benefits. In recent years, of course, the AKP has used "the European project" as a means of selling unpopular and difficult reforms at home. Because the Kemalists have been distrustful of these reforms, they have become more pronounced in their criticism of European motivations. That being said, I think all sides, understand that Turkey's long-term interest require good relations with Europe. And all sides know that the prospect of full Turkish membership in the EU is unlikely in the foreseeable future.
V. Emiyan:- Referring to the recent political crisis in Turkey there are those who say that if the AKP wins that will not necessarily mean that democracy wins, but if it loses democracy will lose. Do you agree?
Prof. Eissenstat:- Yes, I think that is very fair. There is a lot wrong with the AKP. Its liberalization programs have stalled. AKP municipal governments have engaged in some very petty attempts at enforcing social morality. The AKP's commitment to pluralism is incomplete. Its attempts to stifle criticism in the media have been disastrous. Its capacity for cozy deals and nepotism continue much of the worst in Turkish political culture. But the results of the AKP being pushed from power by the military or the courts would be even worse, turning back the clock on Turkish reform and undermining the very clear will of the people as defined by free, fair democratic elections. The costs of this are incalculable. It would demonstrate the anti-democratic aspects of the Turkish Constitution without offering a means by which to reform it. It would close the door on the efforts of Turkey's devout to participate freely in Turkish public life. It would reinforce the role of the Turkish military in defining Turkish political culture.
V. Emiyan:- Cengiz Çandar in his recent article published in the Turkish Daily News has called the arrests linked to the Ergenekon group "The most important event in the history of the Turkish republic". What is your assessment?
Prof. Eissenstat:- Initially, I was very cynical about the Ergenekon arrests. The expansion of arrests last week made me reconsider. The AKP is clearly pushing back against those in the military who are actively considering a coup. From this perspective, it is indeed a very interesting development. But, frankly, it is just too early to tell what the long-term repercussions will be. In the end, the AKP's best hope for avoiding a hard coup may lie not in police action, but within the military itself. There are many officers who understand that a coup would be a disaster for Turkey. This is why we have seen such important leaks regarding military actions in the Turkish press. In some ways, the best hope for avoiding a hard coup lies with these officers, who recognize that, for all the faults of Turkish democracy, a military intervention would be even worse.
V.Emiyan:- In light of Turkish reluctance to carry out substantial reforms and recent developments, how do you assess the prospects of a Turkish EU membership?
Prof. Eissenstat:- Obviously, Turkish reforms – which initially were quite significant – have stalled in recent years and the current crisis has only exacerbated this. A lot happened in the first years of the AKP government, but I don't see serious reforms moving forward unless the current crisis is resolved in a way that reinforces rather than undermines Turkish democracy. That being said, I don't think Europe was ever really serious about Turkish membership… Leaving aside the Islamophobia that colors so much of European politics and leaving aside the tremendous gaps in Turkish democracy, it would still be hard to imagine a Turkey in Europe. Turkey has a population of about 70 million people, making it almost twice the size of Poland. It is poor. It suffers from significant internal fragmentation. And it shares borders with Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Frankly, I don't think that is a deal that you would ever be able to sell to the average European voter.
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